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Abstract 
Climate change has emerged as a major global issue that affects all nations and has become 
a phenomena requiring global governance in the modern globalized world. Though the 
African contribution to the increase Greenhouse Gas (GHG) is very small, climate change 
is a concern of African countries. This paper is aimed to analyze the African position and 
challenges in the governance of climate change. Nonetheless, there are opportunities 
created for adaptation and mitigation, the implementation of these measures is constrained 
by lack of financial, institutional and human capacities. Accordingly, the Africans position 
in the international system and lack of the capacities required for meaningful engagement 
leads to a challenge to participate effectively in global climate change negotiations. Despite 
numerous internal difficulties facing the African countries in climate governance and 
negotiations, this paper argues that African countries have shown an improvement in 
response, and willingness to cooperate and participate compared to previous times. 
Especially, in recent years, African states have managed to negotiate more effectively, both 
individually and as a group.  
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Introduction 
The issue of environment truly emerged onto the international political agenda at the 1972 
UN-run Stockholm conference; however, it was only in the latter decades of the twentieth century 
that environmental problems came to be recognized as more than local or even regional. Though 
environment in general and climate change, in particular, is a global problem that requires global 
solutions, its impacts require the active involvement of multiple national and local-level 
stakeholders in shaping and implementing the solutions. Accordingly, global climate 
governance, or the purposeful mechanisms and measures aimed at steering social systems towards 
preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the risks posed by climate change (IPCC, 2014), has come 
to be one of the central themes of debate and concern among different academic, political and 
economic domains. Climate change governance takes into account principles of accountability, 
management and institutional strengthening which are applied when tackling the various 
challenges posted by climate change. It also includes a wide range of steering mechanisms ranging 
from informal cooperation between different institutions and actors to hierarchical forms of 
regulation. Therefore, climate change governance can be described as a wide variety of 
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coordinating methods contributing to the adaptation and mitigation of climate change (Knieling, 
& Filho, 2013).  
Unlike the recent trend, climate change has had little relevance to development policy-
makers or practitioners, and has been viewed largely as an environmental concern, and 
development approaches have been given less attention within the climate change community. 
According to Makina (2013), climate change will interact at all scales with other trends in global 
environmental and natural resource concerns, including water, soil and air pollution, health 
hazards, disaster risk, and deforestation. Moreover, as Madzwamuse (2010) mentioned, due to its 
predicted impacts on biodiversity, rural livelihoods and national and global economies, since the 
early 1990s, climate change has emerged as a critical development issue. Similarly, climate change 
is a concern of African countries; however, they might reach compliance but agree differently on 
the global provisions towards addressing the global environmental problems. Studies have shown 
that African contribution to the increase in Greenhouse Gas (GHG) is very small when compared 
to that of other more developed continents; however, they are definnitely victims of the climate 
change consequences. Recently, this has been verified at the Lima Climate Conference by the UN 
Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon (2014) who stated that “Climate change affects us all, but it does 
not affect us all equally. The poorest and most vulnerable, those who have done the least to 
contribute to global warming, are bearing the brunt of the impact today.” This paper is primarily 
concerned with climate change governance and humbly tries to examine and analyze the position 
of the African group in international climate politics by examining what the African group has 
been saying regarding climate politics. The emerging literatures on the topic was used to develop 
some preliminary hypotheses on the conditions under which all could expect to enhance the 
African position on global climate politics. Accordingly, the paper found that in Africa, climate 
change creates opportunities to support climate change response in adaptation and mitigation. 
However, Africa has policy and funding challenges for both adaptation and mitigation. African 
countries have become much more proactive during the UNFCCC negotiations since the early 
2000s. A number of quantitative measures were utilized including submissions, delegation size, 
and so on, and qualitative assessments by those within the AGN itself and beyond demonstrating 
that participation has increased substantially.  
In this paper, an introduction is followed by a section that briefly reviews the nexus 
between climate change and development in Africa. The third section presents the empirical 
assessment of the position and challenges of Africa in international climate change politics.  This 
section has two sub-sections. The first will focus on the African initiatives and their demands, the 
role of different institutions contributing to the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN’s) work and 
the African common position negotiation strategies. The second sub-section will focus on the 1) 
African position in mitigation policy debate and responses; 2) African group's position before the 
Lima climate conference; 3) African group's position at the Lima climate conference; and 4) the 
challenges facing the African group during the negotiations. A final section concludes by 
summarizing the main findings and pointing out future implications. 
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Climate Change and Development in Africa 
Here is an attempt to address the relationship between climate change and development in 
the African perspective. Until recently, climate change has little relevance to development policy-
makers or practitioners. According to Madzwamuse, M. (2010), climate was viewed largely as an 
environmental concern and development approaches have been given less attention within the 
climate change community, which instead favors natural science approaches focusing on reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, climate change has emerged as a critical development issue 
since the early 1990s due to its predicted impacts on biodiversity, rural livelihoods and national 
and global economies. In addition, it was found in the recent initiatives to strengthen links between 
climate change and development communities, and experts can no longer ignore the fact that most 
climate change impacts will fall predominantly on the world’s poorest people. Recently, this has 
been verified at the Lima Climate Change Conference, 2014, by the UN Secretary General, Ban 
Ki-moon. 
There have been three conferences held on Climate Change and Development in Africa 
(CCDA) and each conference presents an opportunity for stakeholders to deliberate on Africa’s 
development in the context of climate change. These conferences have the theme of advancing 
knowledge, policy and practice on climate change and development. The third conference was 
held in 2013, and created forums for dialogue that raised awareness of the importance of climate 
change, its impacts on development, and the nexus between science, policy and practice. The 
findings of the conference showed the need to mainstream climate change through development 
policy planning, programming and implementation. Accordingly, the conference did not pass 
without mentioning the imperative which is clear and shows that climate change is a threat and an 
opportunity (CCDA_III, 2013) . 
 
Analyzing the Position and Challenges of the African Group  
in the Global Climate Change Politics 
This paper argues that African countries have shown an improvement in response, and 
willingness to cooperate and participate in climate control compared to previous times. This 
section will have three main parts: 1) The position of the African group in mitigation policy debate 
and responses; 2) The position of the African group in global climate change negotiations; and 3) 
The challenges facing the African group during the negotiations.  Before engaging in looking at 
these issues, it is necessary to review the regional initiatives and institutional contributions to the 
African Group of Negotiators (AGNs) and some of the African demands related to climate change.  
 
African Initiatives on Climate Change 
For more than a decade, the world has been negotiating global agreements under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At the UNFCCC, a number of 
actors, groups and platforms are instrumental in the development of a consolidated African 
position. A Conference of the Parties, or COP, to negotiate climate change has been held annually 
since 1995. Though AU adopted its own Declaration on Climate Change and Development in 
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2007, the first time that it clearly expressed a common position was at the Copenhagen COP in 
2009 when it put forward the ‘African Common Position on Climate Change’ that set the mandate 
for African negotiators (AU/AMCEN, 2009).  This position was built on the core concept of 
‘environmental justice’ and stated that adaptation is the highest priority for Africa, since the 
continent’s greenhouse gas emissions are so small. The AU has followed various strategies and 
cooperated with a variety of actors on climate change issues, such as multiculturalism, bilateralism 
and regionalism (Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen, & Wyk, 2014). 
 
The Role of Different Institutions Contributing to the Africa Group of Negotiators  
(AGN’s) Work 
The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), initially formed in 
1985, is a key platform involved in the process of presenting the African common position to the 
UNFCCC. AMCEN has played a key role in terms of improving coordination of the common 
African position. It has worked towards a common framework in which all climate change 
programs in Africa are merged. For example, the African common position of 2009 was updated 
at an AMCEN session and endorsed by the AU. AMCEN’s African Group of Experts, the technical 
segment of AMCEN, has been instrumental in this respect. AMCEN provides technical input as 
well as political oversight to the AGN. The Conference of African Heads of State and Government 
on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) is the highest continental body for approving and endorsing the 
common position. However, CAHOSCC is also fragmented, which has impeded smooth 
functioning. Other key partners in supporting the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) are the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and African Climate Policy Centre 
(ACPC) that have provided technical support to the AGN during the preparation for the UNFCCC 
negotiations. In order to support its capacity, the AGN is supported by other technical agencies 
such as the UN. Compared to the above-mentioned institutions which enable consultation and 
coordination at the continental level to prepare for negotiations and develop the common position, 
there are regional and sub-regional initiatives that have proven fragile in several instances of 
negotiating positions. In turn, incoherence in their respective negotiating positions has generally 
weakened the position of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations (Ramsamy et al., 2014) .  
 
The African Common Position and Some of Their Demands 
As Roger and Belliethathan (2016)  discussed in their article, the African common position 
on the African Environment and Development was announced at the Second Regional African 
Ministerial Conference for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) held in Cote D’Ivoire in 1991. The 1991 conference, which marked the first occasion 
in which all African states officially addressed the issue of climate change as a group, established 
many principles that would become commonplace in African environmental diplomacy. For 
example, it asserted the priority of economic development, improvement of quality of life and the 
reduction in poverty over environmental considerations. It maintained that food and energy 
security were vital concerns for African governments and affirmed their sovereignty over the use 
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of natural resources. In order to achieve sustainable development, the common position called for 
large financial transfers, transfers of technology and capacity building programs. According to 
Hoste (2010), the process of the African position started in 2006. In addition, their common 
position was initiated in 2008 in Algiers followed by the Nairobi Declaration in 2009 that resulted 
in the common position. However, they made the key demands of the African Group based on the 
Common Position of the Committee of the African Heads of State on Climate Change 
(CAHOSCC) (Hoste, 2010).  These include:  
a) Financial compensation for natural, economic and social resources that have been lost and 
the historical responsibility of developed countries on climate change in that respect (the 
financial commitment of developed countries should be at least 1.5% of their global GDP). 
b) The UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities should be respected. 
c) Methodological demand: the African group wanted to keep the two track negotiations. This 
meant they wanted to keep the distinction between the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention.  
d) That developed countries needed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% 
below 1990 levels by 2020. By 2050 the GHG-emissions of developed countries should be 
at least 80% to 95% below 1990 levels. In order to achieve the lowest level of stabilization 
assessed by the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report. Furthermore, Hoste (2010) noted that 
the African common position explicitly stipulated that they will not accept any delay by 
developed countries to deeply cut their GHG emissions and asked for support for Africa to 
adapt to the negative impacts of climate change. 
 
The Position of the African Group in Mitigation Policy Debate and Responses   
Under the African ministerial level conference, the climate change debate has primarily 
focused on adaptation rather than mitigation as historically Africa’s contribution to global GHG 
emissions has been small - approximately 1.75% of global energy, CO2 emissions from 1950-
2000; and 3.85% of annual GHG emissions in 2000 (Winkler & Zipplies, 2009) (AMCEN, 2011).  
Therefore, understandably the focus amongst practitioners, particularly in the context of the 
UNFCCC climate negotiations, has been on attracting finance to build Africa’s adaptive capacity. 
Whilst as a non-Annex 1 region, it is excluded from any quantified mitigation commitments under 
the UNFCCC, and therefore, less emphasis is placed on mitigation. Since Africa needs to develop 
economically to meet its priority of eradicating poverty, developing along a cleaner energy path, 
and moving towards low carbon development, mitigation will be necessary in order to maintain 
economic competitiveness in a global economy. The Africa Group has called on developing 
countries to undertake several key actions relating to mitigation. These include: 
1) A science-based aggregate target for developed countries to ensure to individually or 
collectively reduce emissions in accordance with science, equity and historical 
responsibility; 
2) Individual commitments that are negotiated among all Parties to ensure developed 
countries make adequate and equitable contributions to the Convention’s objective; 
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3) Individual commitments that are binding in international law, not merely statements of 
intention, or commitments that are binding merely in national law; 
4) Effective reporting on achievement of commitments;  
5) Review and continuing commitments by developed countries during second and 
subsequent commitment periods; and 
6) Mechanisms for compliance to ensure that developed countries fulfill their legally binding 
commitments in practice. 
On the whole, the African Group insists on the elaboration of a detailed and clear work 
program for the Kyoto Protocol with the aim of adopting a final decision for the second 
commitment period in Durban in 2011. On policy approaches on issues relating to Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), African country parties are willing 
to undertake the following mitigation measures commensurate with their respective capabilities 
and national circumstances: a) Reduce emissions from deforestation; b) Reduce emissions from 
forest degradation; c) Conserve forest carbon stocks; and d) Sustain management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks (AMCEN, 2011).  
 
The Position of the African Group in the Global Climate Change Negotiations 
Before engaging in examining the position of the African countries, it is necessary to 
understand how the African countries participate in the international climate negotiations. 
Therefore, according to Hoste (2010), one of the most important structural features of multilateral 
negotiations is the emergence of coalitions. Moreover, the analysis of the capacity of developing 
countries in multilateral negotiations would be incomplete without a section on the coalitions. 
African countries negotiate through the Group of 77 + China (G77), LDCs and through the Africa 
Group. South-South cooperation is particularly visible with the UNFCCC negotiations, with the 
most important developing country coalition being the G77. In addition, African countries 
participate in international negotiations through country groups and delegations that often 
negotiate in their own capacity and within these coalitions. According to Roger (2013), Africa’s 
climate negotiations are being strongly led by the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN). One 
country is selected to chair the group for a period of two years and in January 2014, the Republic 
of the Sudan became its chair. The AGN’s structure consists of all African Member States’ senior 
officials, experts and negotiators in the UNFCCC negotiations with the African Ministerial 
Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) providing political oversight to the group. It represents 
the region in the international climate change negotiations with a common and unified voice. Since 
the Earth Summit in 1992, African states have participated in coalitions such as the G77, Alliance 
of Small Island States (AOSIS), and OPEC, and they have worked together as a regional group 
through the African Group of Negotiators (AGN).  
From the literature we can understand that scholars, including Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen 
and Wyk (2014) as well as Roger (2013) and Dongo (2011) argued to the effective participation 
of Africa as a group in the international climate change negotiations. As Dongo argued,
 in the 
interest of a fair and equitable global response to climate change, Africa’s active and influential 
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role in the climate change negotiations must be sustained. As African participation continues to 
grow, strategies and resources need to be made available to create a space for many that will help 
build a much stronger African voice. Therefore, the reasons for the effective participation as a 
group in international climate change negotiations include (IISD, 2014): 
1) Over the past five years, African negotiators have been able to considerably improve their 
access to material resources, allowing them to increase the size and quality of their 
delegations. 
2) African negotiators have sought resources from a variety of international donors and 
multilateral institutions. For example, at the request of the chair of the AGN, the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) started to provide funding in 2008 for African delegates to 
participate in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
3) African states have improved their access to information and expertise. 
4) African delegates have been able to negotiate with a much clearer mandate from African 
leaders in recent years. 
 
Furthermore, as other scholars such as Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen and Wyk (2014) argue, 
Africa in recent years shows a consistent effort to formulate common positions ahead of key 
moments in the global agenda. Creating the African Common Positions involves both technical 
and political input from various African actors, organizations and platforms. African negotiators 
often seek to form international partnerships to push their agenda forward. Accordingly, from the 
discussions, we can understand that African’s internal challenges, especially before the last five 
years, were the cause for its ineffective participation in global climate change politics. However, 
recently it is easier to agree with those who argue that the African group is showing effective 
participation in international climate negotiations. 
 
African group’s position before the Lima climate conference. 
Though the 1991 Cote d’Ivoire’s regional ministerial conference marked the first occasion 
in which all African states officially addressed the issue of climate change as a group, until 2006, 
African states had submitted more than 20 submissions and agenda items. Beginning around 2005, 
however, as the effects of Africa’s lack of influence became particularly apparent, the AGN slowly 
started to have a greater impact on the UNFCCC negotiations. From 2007 onwards, African 
countries submitted less than 40 agenda items. Furthermore, in 2011 at COP17 in Durban, they 
put forward about 100 submissions and agenda items, a number roughly equivalent to the total 
submitted between 1991 and 2005.  Indeed, after 2009, the number of AGN submissions even 
dwarfed those of the G77/China, reversing a trend that had prevailed since the UNFCCC’s early 
years when the G77/China dominated (Roger & Belliethathan, 2016). As Roger and Belliethathan 
(2016) and Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen and Wyk (2014) recently discussed, African participation 
in the UNFCCC has improved as demonstrated in the following conferences: 
 At the 2006 COP12: COP12, which took place in Nairobi in 2006, proved to be a turning 
point. As the first COP to take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, the meeting offered an ideal 
12  http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/ 
opportunity to call attention to the region’s concerns in front of a global audience. It also 
helped to raise the issue’s salience among African leaders. As a result, more resources were 
devoted to the talks, and African negotiators made significant efforts to develop a common 
position that would adequately reflect Africa’s urgent needs. The meeting enabled Africa’s 
negotiators to reach a consensus on several issues, not only on adaptation and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), but also deforestation, climate finance and technology 
transfer. As a result of the AGN’s efforts, the conference achieved two important outcomes 
meant to address some of the major issues it had identified. The first was the Nairobi Work 
Program on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change which sought to 
improve capacity building related to adaptation decision-making in LDCs. The second was 
the Nairobi Framework - aimed to facilitate participation of under-represented countries in 
the CDM (Reger & Belliethathan, 2016). 
Similarly, Ramsamy; Knoll; Knaepen and Wyk (2014) scrutinized the positions of the 
African group before the Lima climate conference:  
 In the run-up to COP 15: In subsequent negotiations, African efforts to influence the 
negotiations grew substantially, especially during and after COP15 in Copenhagen. During 
this conference African country showed more willingness to act jointly, and they argued 
that Africa was one of the most united groups at COP 15 articulating its position very well 
as a result of polishing the common position. The proposal of a “common responsibility 
framework for mitigation” put forth by developed countries was perceived by Africa as 
blurring the distinction between the commitments of developed countries and those of 
developing countries, as laid down in the earlier mentioned CBDR-principle. Sudan, for 
the Group of 77, and China, G-77/China, called upon parties to observe the principles of 
good faith, transparency, inclusiveness and openness. Africans are already impacted by 
climate change through increased droughts, health hazards, food scarcity and migration. 
The African representative called for transparent and equitable negotiations during the 
high-level segment. 
 At the 2010 COP 16, held in Cancun: African political leaders showed significant 
differences, especially among regional powers, whereas technical negotiators appeared 
united. It was nearly impossible to consolidate the political and technical positions. 
 At the 2011 COP 17, in Durban: An African flagship partnership was created. This was the 
first time Africa had a dedicated platform at the conference for high-level engagement. 
This partnership was the result of preparation for the COP and support from continental 
institutions including the African Development Bank. At this conference, African countries 
put forward about 100 submissions and agenda items. 
 During the COP19, held in Warsaw in 2013: Africa presented a common position. The 
African Group of Negotiators (AGN) pointed out that historical responsibility in 
greenhouse gas emissions as well as loss and damage should be addressed. As a result, a 
Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage was established. This addresses loss and damage 
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associated with the impacts of climate change, including extreme events in the most 
vulnerable developing countries. 
 
African group's position at the Lima climate conference. 
Though the current chair of the African group is from the Republic of the Sudan, during 
the Lima climate conference, it was observed that countries like Swaziland, Kenya, Ghana and 
Ethiopia spoke on behalf of the African group. In this section, the paper scrutinizes the position of 
the African group with some other countries’ positions for the sake of comparison. At the COP20, 
held in 2014 in Lima, substantive negotiations took place on the seven elements of: finance; 
adaptation; mitigation; cooperation and support; transparency of action and support; technology; 
and capacity building (IISD, 2014): 
 Finance: on differentiation, Sudan, for the African Group, with Ecuador and Bolivia, for  
G-77/China opposed text suggesting “all” parties mobilize climate finance through a 
diversity of actions. The African Group recalled differentiation between developed and 
developing countries under the Convention, and the responsibility of developed countries 
to provide finance. Mexico clarified that “results-based” is not a precondition for access to 
finance, and stressed prioritizing both mitigation and adaptation finance. The EU clarified 
that “evolving responsibilities and capabilities” captures the growth in the levels of 
prosperity and GHG emissions of developing countries, noting that some are currently 
more prosperous than some EU member states. However, on Thursday, 4 December, 
Sudan, for the African Group, supported by Bolivia, for the G-77/China, Saudi Arabia, 
Maldives, India, South Africa, Ecuador, Zambia, Pakistan, Argentina and others introduced 
a conference room paper (CRP) containing draft elements of climate finance under the 
ADP, requesting that it replace the Co-Chairs’ non-paper as the basis for discussion. 
 Adaptation:  On loss and damage, the African Group and others, opposed by Australia, 
emphasized that it should become a stand-alone element in the new agreement. New 
Zealand opposed any reinterpretation of Decision 2/CP.19 (Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage).  
 Mitigation: On differentiation, Kenya, for the African Group, lamented the overall lack of 
reference to equity, CBDR, mitigation obligations of developed countries, and specific 
national and regional development priorities. The EU said the text should reflect that all 
parties will eventually take quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets. The US 
called for an option in the text to update the Convention’s annexes to reflect parties 
changing economic and emissions trends. 
 Cooperation and Support: Many parties supported consolidating the section on cooperation 
and support with sections on other elements. 
 Transparency of Action and Support: South Africa, supported by Mexico, proposed 
launching a process for discussing transparency rules during 2015, with South Africa says 
this should be reflected in the ADP conclusions from Lima. The African Group, South 
Africa, Chile, Panama, Nauru, Brazil and Mexico called for building on the existing 
14  http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/ 
measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) framework, with some suggesting it could 
evolve over time. The African Group cautioned against placing additional burdens on 
developing countries. Argentina, the LDCs, the African Group, Saudi Arabia and China 
emphasized differentiation, with many calling for maintaining the existing “two-track” 
approach to MRV. 
 Technology: Swaziland, for the African Group, said that commitments should not shift 
responsibility from developed to developing countries, nor encourage private over public 
support. On institutional arrangements, Swaziland, for the African Group, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Algeria and Argentina preferred anchoring institutional arrangements in the 
Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
(CTCN). 
 Capacity Building: Regarding institutional arrangements, South Africa, China, India, Iran, 
Tanzania, Tuvalu for the LDCs, and others were opposed by Canada, Japan, the EU, the 
US and others in regard to supporting the establishment of an international capacity-
building mechanism. India noted that mobilization of private capital cannot be one of its 
essential elements. Switzerland, for the Environmental Integrity Group, the EU, Belize, 
Chile for AILAC, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Belarus, the Russian Federation, and 
Turkey endorsed the Co-Chairs’ text. Sudan for the African Group, Malaysia for the 
LMDCs, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, India, Uganda, Paraguay, Pakistan and others were 
opposed to the text. The African Group stressed the importance of the principles of the 
Convention; the concept of differentiation, cautioning against undermining it implicitly or 
explicitly, adaptation as Africa’s priorities, and equal and balanced treatment of these 
elements alongside mitigation and transparency. Noting that the gap is gradually closing, 
Nigeria asked parties to address issues raised by the African Group. Calling the text 
unacceptable in its current form, the Democratic Republic of the Congo identified areas 
not addressed, including: parity among the elements, differentiation, scope of INDCs 
beyond mitigation, and work stream 2 (pre-2020 ambition). 
 
The Challenges Facing the African Group During the Negotiations 
Historically, as Roger (2013) discussed, delegations from Africa have faced challenges 
related to participating effectively in global climate change negotiations as a result of their position 
in the international system and a lack of the capacities required for meaningful engagement. In 
recent years, African states have nevertheless managed to negotiate more effectively, both 
individually and as a group. Critical to this has been efforts to gain access to material resources 
and better information, as well as clearer mandates from African leaders. On the other hand, other 
scholars Ramsamy et al (2014) argue that some of the main causes of fragmentation within the 
group are policy positions on climate change, which vary according to environmental and political 
priorities as well as the ways states are classified. For example, within the Group there is the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that places emphasis on response 
measures. There is also the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) that are pushing for all large 
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GHG emitters to take more responsibility in reaching the 2 degree limit in temperature, while the 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have a particular interest in finance, technology transfer and 
adaptation. Within this mix, South Africa stands out, not only as one of the continent’s largest 
economies, but as a significant contributor to GHG emissions.  
Moreover, the challenge facing South Africa is that it is part of the AGN, but at the same 
time, it is also aligned with other geopolitical groupings including the BASIC that includes Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China. The BASIC group was established in 2009, initially to promote the 
Copenhagen Accord and to promote the interests of the G77 with regards to GHG emission 
reduction commitments. These all pose a challenge that Africa as a continent is still working 
through. Similarly, Mekina (2013) mentioned the challenges of African countries during the 
negotiation in international climate change politics. The following could be a typical example:  
 Delegation Size: Many African country delegations are comprised of fewer people than 
those of more developed countries. 
 Delegation Composition: African delegations habitually negotiate in isolation without 
sufficient support from their countries. Richer delegations may be accompanied by policy 
makers and scientists who can decipher the complex technical language, its implications to 
national priorities, and provide supporting evidence. 
 Lack of Negotiating Experience: Many country negotiators are not familiarity with how 
negotiations are done. 
 Science versus Diplomacy: Many country negotiators lack research to support their 
positions. 
 Other Technical Issues: There are technical challenges specific to some African country 
delegations. These include slow or lack of Internet, which limits access to networks that 
can serve as information resources and powerful contacts. 
 Politics of the Africa Group: As with all diverse negotiating coalitions, the Africa Group 
is not immune to politics. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper attempted to examine the position and challenges of the African countries in 
international climate change politics. Though studies have shown that African contribution to the 
increase in Greenhouse Gas (GHG) is very small, they are definitely victims of the climate change 
consequences. Climate change has emerged as a critical development issue since the early 1990s 
due to its predicted impacts on biodiversity, rural livelihoods and national and global economies. 
Accordingly, climate change is a concern of African countries; however, they might comply and 
agree differently on the global provisions towards addressing the global environmental problems. 
Therefore, the paper has analyzed the position and challenges facing the African countries for the 
governance of climate change, addressed this issue in the third section of the paper that is organized 
as: 1) the African position in mitigation policy debate and responses; 2) the African group's 
position before the Lima climate conference; 3) the African group's position at the Lima climate 
conference; and 4) the challenges facing the African group during the negotiations.  
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The paper argues that both adaptation and mitigation have opportunities and challenges. 
To utilize the opportunities effectively and to reduce the negative effects of climate change, 
strengthening the institutional capacities will be the first thing to be considered in our mind. For 
this, there have been institutions that have initiatives, plans and strategies to respond to the 
challenges arising from climate change. However, the implementation of these measures is 
constrained by inadequate financial, institutional and human capacities. Africa needs to have an 
effective voice at international climate conferences and influence on the global agreement that will 
emerge to ensure that development and poverty reduction agendas are included in the outcome and 
follow-up action at national, regional and global levels.  
As was discussed, the UNFCC instruments for capacity building, finance and technology 
transfer have presented the main opportunities for the participation of African countries. As a 
result, African countries have become much more proactive in UNFCCC negotiations.  A number 
of quantitative measures, including submissions, delegation size, and qualitative assessments by 
those within the AGN itself and beyond, demonstrate that participation has increased substantially. 
Conferences of the Parties, or COPs, to negotiate climate change have been held annually since 
1995. The AU adopted its own declaration on Climate Change and Development in 2007, and it 
clearly expressed a common position at the Copenhagen COP in 2009 when it put forward the 
African Common Position on Climate Change that set the mandate of African negotiators.  
One of the most important structural features of multilateral negotiations is the emergence 
of coalitions. Accordingly, African countries negotiate through the Group of 77 + China (G77), 
LDCs and the Africa Group. Africa’s climate negotiations are currently being strongly led by the 
Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN), an alliance that consists of climate change negotiators from 
every African country. The paper scrutinizes the African group’s position in the previous 
conferences as well as in the Lima climate conference. Before the Lima conference, in terms of 
polishing the common position, Africa was one of the most united groups at COP 15, articulating 
its position very well. Moreover, at the Durban Conference an African flagship partnership was 
created. This was the first time Africa had a dedicated platform for high-level engagement at the 
conference. 
At the COP 20, held in 2014 in Lima, substantive negotiations took place on seven 
elements: finance; adaptation; mitigation; cooperation and support; transparency of action and 
support; technology; and capacity building. At this conference, African countries, including Sudan, 
Kenya, Swaziland, and South Africa for the African Group, passionately expressed the overall lack 
of reference to equity, CBDR, mitigation obligations of developed countries, and specific national 
and regional development priorities. The African Group also said that commitments should not 
shift responsibility from developed to developing countries, nor encourage private over public 
support. Similarly, they stressed the importance of the principles of the convention, the concept of 
differentiation, the cautioning against undermining implicitly or explicitly, the adaptation as 
Africa’s priority, and equal and balanced treatment of these elements alongside mitigation and 
transparency. Historically, the Africans position in the international system and lack of capacities 
required for meaningful engagement led to a challenge to participate effectively in global climate 
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change negotiations. However, in recent years, African states have managed to negotiate more 
effectively, both individually and as a group. The reasons for the effective participation as a group 
in international climate change negotiations include improving their access to material resources, 
and improving their access to information and expertise that enable them to negotiate with a much 
clearer mandate. Apart from the UNFCC finance provisions of the AGNs, the African 
Development Bank has also contributed a significant role in the AGNs work. The principle of 
equity, which the African groups framed, has led them to participate effectively in global climate 
change negotiations.  
However, the paper also identified some of the problems facing the group. Fragmentation 
within the African Group has been one of the challenges, and the main causes are policy positions 
on climate change, which vary according to environmental and political priorities as well as the 
ways states are classified. Besides, the challenge facing South Africa in negotiation is that it is part 
of the AGN, but at the same time, it is aligned with other geopolitical groupings including the 
BASIC countries of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. Other challenges facing African 
countries during negotiations include delegation size, delegation composition, lack of familiarity 
of how negotiations are done, lack of research based on science and diplomacy, and lack of 
immunity from politics. 
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